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Abstract 
The empirical literature suggests that diversified firms are usually sold at a discount 
relative to single-segment firms. This ‘diversification discount’ is usually considered as 
a symptom of managers pursuing diversification strategies to benefit themselves rather 
than to increase firm value. We provide evidence that suggests that managers 
themselves disagree with outsiders valuation and consider diversification strategies to 
be value increasing. Specifically, However, we foundwe document that corporate 
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insiders purchase more of their firms’ shares in the open market when industrial 
diversification is high and when outsiders consider diversification to be more value-
destructive (i.e. when diversification discount is high). Thus, corporate insiders, whose 
human capital is already tied to the prospects of their firms, consider their 
diversification strategies to be valuable enough to justify more investment in their firms. 
Outside investors, however, may misvalue diversification strategies if corporate 
diversification creates higher information asymmetries between insiders and outsiders. 
We provide some evidence for a positive relationship between the corporate 
diversification and information asymmetries. Specifically, we report that the market 
reaction to insider trading is increasing in the extent of corporate diversification.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Corporate diversification, insider trading, diversification discount, 
information asymmetry, agency theory. 
JEL classification: G14, G32 
 
 
1 – Introduction  
A persistent concern within the finance and management literature is the impact of 
corporate diversification on the firm value1, the agency effect. From the dominant 
agency theory perspective, managers implement diversification strategies to benefit 
themselves at the expense of their shareholders (e.g.( Amihud and Lev, 1981; Denis, 
Denis and Sarin, 1999; Aggarwal and Samwick, 2003). We call this the ‘agency effect’ 
                                                 
1
 See Montgomery (1994), Martin and Sayrak (2003) and Hitt et al. (2006) for reviews.  
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of corporate diversification. This agency effect is widely invoked by researchers who 
argue that diversified firms are usually sold at a discount when compared to single-
segment (focused) firms (see Lins and Servaes, 1999; Denis et al., 2002; Jiraporn et al., 
2007).  
 
An alternative view is that diversification may be in the interests of both  there may not 
necessarily be a conflict of interests between managers and shareholders when it comes 
to strategic decisions such as those related to corporate diversification (see Fox and 
Hamilton, 1994; Lane et al., 1998; Davis et al., 1997; Postrel and Rumelt, 2005). 
However, in the presence of information asymmetries ‘principals may not be able to 
distinguish between agent cooperation and defection’ (Gomez-Meija and Wiseman 
2007: 82). Thus, even if managers diversify with the view to increase the value of their 
firms, outside investors may undervalue diversification if it results in higher information 
asymmetries between managers and outsides. We call this, the ‘information effect’ of 
diversification. 
 
The extant empirical literature is silent on whether it is the agency effect or the 
information effect that dominates. This is unfortunate because these two effects have 
radically different implications for the management literature and for corporate policy. 
For example, if the agency effect dominates, then the emphasis is likely to be on 
creating corporate governance mechanisms that ensure that managers avoid 
diversification and focus on their firms’ core competencies (see Denis et al., 2002; 
Jiraporn et al., 2007). However, if the information effect dominates, then diversification 
is unlikely to be considered as a “‘value-destructive”’ strategy. Consequently, the 
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emphasis is likely to be on mechanisms that enable managers to materialise potential 
operating and financial synergies associated with diversification, and to signal value-
relevance of these strategies to their shareholders (see Lane et al., 1998, 1999). We We 
contribute to literature by providingprovide  evidence that enables us to distinguish 
between the agency effect and the information effect of corporate diversification. 
 
Our analysis is based upon the established insider trading literature2 that suggests that 
corporate insiders trade shares of their firms on the basis of their informational 
advantage over outsiders about the prospects of their firms (e.g. Fishman and Hagerty, 
1992), and that outside investors consider these trades as credible signals about the 
value of firms (e.g. Damodaran and Liu, 1993; Manne, 2005). We utilise this literature 
to contribute to the debate on the agency effect and the information effect of corporate 
diversification in four important ways.  
 
Firstly, we propose and test hypotheses that link the intensity of insider purchases to 
corporate diversification and diversification discount. We argue that if insiders pursue 
diversification strategies to extract private benefits and not to increase their firms’ value 
(the agency effect), then they have little incentive to buy shares of their firms in the 
open market given that they can buy shares of other firms to create a diversified 
portfolio. However, if they really consider corporate diversification to be value-
enhancing, they would buy their own firms’ shares more actively, especially when they 
believe that outsiders incorrectly undervalue their diversification strategies due to 
                                                 
2
 See Bainbridge (2001) for a review. Following the large body of literature on the subject, insider trading 
in this paper refers to trades by executive and non-executive directors, which is compatible with the UK 
regulation that defines insiders as executives and non-executives directors (e.g. Fidrmuc et al., 2006). In 
the remaining text, we will use the terms directors and insiders interchangeably. 
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information asymmetries (the information effect). We find that the intensity of insider 
purchases is increasing in the extent of industrial diversification and in the level of 
diversification discount. This evidence is consistent with the information effect. 
 
Secondly, we provide further evidence on the link between corporate diversification and 
the information asymmetries between corporate insiders and outside investors by 
examining the market reaction to insider trading. Unlike earlier papers that rely on bid-
ask spread (e.g. Clarke et al., 2004), analysts’ forecasts errors (e.g. Thomas, 2002; Duru 
and Reeb, 2002) and market reaction to equity offerings (e.g. Hadlock et al., 2001), we 
provide more direct evidence on insiders’ informational advantage over outsiders by 
examining how outside investors react when insiders trade shares of their firms in the 
open market. We argue that if corporate diversification increases insiders’ informational 
advantage over outsiders, the market reaction to insider trading will be increasing in the 
extent of corporate diversification. Our results support this argument.  
 
Thirdly, we examine the impact of both industrial and geographic diversification on the 
level of information asymmetries between insiders and outside investors. To the best of 
our knowledge, the existing empirical studies in this area concentrate either on 
industrial diversification (e.g. Hadlock et al., 2001; Thomas, 2002) or on geographic 
diversification (Duru and Reeb, 2002). We examine both types of diversification and 
find some evidence that suggests that industrial and geographic diversification differ in 
terms of their relationship with the level of information asymmetries between insiders 
and outsiders.  
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Finally, tTo the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to look at the information 
asymmetries due to corporate diversification using non-US data. The rest of the paper is 
structured as follows. The next section provides a brief review of related literature and 
outlines our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our methods and data. Section 4 presents 
our empirical results. Section 5 summarises and concludes. 
  
2 –Related literature and hypotheses development 
2.1 – Corporate diversification, agency relationship and information asymmetries  
The literature suggests that by diversifying into new lines of businesses, firms could 
benefit from economies of scope (Teece, 1982), increased market power and 
competitive advantage (Markides and Williamson, 1994), higher debt capacity (e.g. 
Llewellyn, 1971), and/or more active internal capital markets (e.g. Stein, 1997; Rajan et 
al., 2004). Geographic diversification, in addition, could enable firms to “‘accentuate 
their existing core competencies, gain unique knowledge, and access substantial growth 
opportunities in the product markets of foreign countries (Hitt et al., 2006: 834)”’. 
 
Despite the above potential benefits of corporate diversification, recent empirical 
literature suggests that diversification destroys shareholder wealth (e.g. Berger and 
Ofek, 1995; Lins and Servaes, 1999; Palich et al., 2000; Barnes and Hardie-Brown, 
2006)3. The value destruction due to diversification is usually explained from the 
agency theory perspective in which managers diversify in order to obtain private 
benefits rather than to increase the value of their firms (see, e.g., Denis et al., 2002; 
                                                 
3
 However, some studies do find that diversification results in a premium rather than a discount. For 
example, Villalonga (2004) uses establishment level data and documents significant diversification 
premium. Barnes and Hardie-Brown (2006) and Qian et al. (2008) suggest that, within some sectors, 
geographical diversification may significantly increase firm value.  
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Aggarwal and Samwick, 2003; Jiraporn et al., 2007). An early work in this area is that 
of Amihud and Lev (1981: 606), who argue that managers diversify in order to reduce 
‘risk associated with managerial human capital’. Moreover, managers may utilise 
internal capital markets in multi-segment firms to sustain their empires by transferring 
free cash-flow from cash-rich segments to other segments that lack good investment 
opportunities (e.g. Jensen, 1986; Rajan et al., 2002).  
 
However, it is also argued that, within the context of important strategic decisions such 
as those related to corporate diversification, managerial choices may be moulded by 
social ties and settings, and, indeed professionalism or altruism (see, for example, Davis 
et al., 1997; Postrel and Rumelt, 2005; Gomez-Meija and Wiseman, 2007). In other 
wordsFrom this perspective, corporate diversification strategies are implemented by 
managers with a view to enhance the value of their firms (see Lane et al., 1998; Davis et 
al., 1997). But then, how can this alternative perspective explain the existence of 
diversification discount? 
 
One possible explanation is the ‘transparency’  approach, is based on the argument that 
corporate diversification increases information asymmetries between insiders and 
outside investors (e.g. Hadlock et al. 2001; (Nanda and Narayanan, 1999; Krishnaswami 
and Subramaniam, 1999; Aoki, 2010). Hadlock et al. (2001) call this ‘the transparency 
hypothesis’. Here, it is argued that aAn increase in corporate diversification makes firms 
more complex and opaque, and the consolidated information available to outsiders is 
insufficient to assess the true value of these firms. Consequently, even if managers 
implement diversification strategies to utilise pHenceotential benefits associated with 
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these strategies, increased information asymmetries could lead to a misvaluation by 
outside investors. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) provide some empirical 
support for this transparency effect by documenting a decrease in information 
asymmetries, as measured by analysts’ forecast errors, after corporate spin-offs that 
reduce the level of corporate diversification (c.f.see also, Duru and Reeb, 2002; Bergh 
et al., 2008).  
 
However, some studies also pposit a negative relationship between the level of 
information asymmetries and corporate diversification (see (Hadlock et al, 2001). The 
‘information diversification’ approach hypothesis’ suggests that if outsiders’ valuation 
errors about individual segments of diversified firms are not perfectly positively 
correlated, then the average valuation errors for diversified firms are smaller than those 
for focused firms. Consequently, information asymmetries are expected to be lower for 
diversified firm (see Hadlock et al., 2001). Thomas (2002) provides supporting 
evidence for this hypothesis by documenting a negative relationship between 
diversification and analysts’ forecasts errors (see also Clarke et al., 2004). 
 
2.2 – Corporate diversification, insiders’ beliefs and the intensity of insider trading 
Why do corporate insiders trade shares of their firms in the open market?4 The insider 
trading literature suggests that corporate insiders trade shares of their firms because they 
can benefit from their superior information about the prospects of their firms and/or 
they believe that outsiders misvalue their firms on the basis of the available information 
(Seyhun, 1986; Piotroski and Roulstone, 2005). For example, Rozeff and Zaman (1998) 
                                                 
4
 See Bainbridge (2001) for a review.  
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document that insiders take advantage of market overreaction by selling overvalued 
‘growth stock’ and buying undervalued ‘value stocks’. By willingly purchasing shares 
of their firms in the open market, corporate insiders can send credible signals to 
outsiders about the value of strategies that they implement (see Damodaran and Liu, 
1993; Manne, 2005).  Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) note that the intensity of insider 
purchases is significantly positively related to firms’ future performance (e.g. one year 
ahead market-adjusted returns), and negatively related to current performance (e.g. 
contemporaneous market-adjusted returns).  
 
We build upon this literature and propose hypotheses relating the intensity of insider 
purchases to the extent of corporate diversification and to diversification discount. 
Given that insiders’ human capital is already tied to their firms (e.g. Amihud and Lev, 
1981), purchasing shares of their own firms is costly because it increases the amount of  
firm-specific risk that corporate insiders are exposed to (see Demsetz, 1986). However, 
corporate insiders can benefit by trading on the basis of their informational advantage 
over outside investors (see Fishman and Hagerty, 1992). In addition, by willingly 
purchasing shares of their firms in the open market, corporate insiders can send credible 
signals to outsiders about the value of strategies that they implement (see Damodaran 
and Liu, 1993; Manne, 2005). However, iIf insiders believe that their strategies are 
value-enhancing, and that outsiders misvalue their firms due to information 
asymmetries, then they have more incentives to actively purchase shares of their firms 
in the open market. Within the context of this paper  Hence, insiders’ incentive to buy 
shares of their firms may is likely to be contingent upon their knowledge and beliefs 
about the value relevance of corporate diversification.  
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Insider trading and the agency effect of corporate diversification 
From the agency theory perspective on corporate diversification, insiders’ incentive to 
purchase shares of their firms is likely to be particularly low because they know that 
they have implemented diversification strategies with the intention to benefit 
themselves rather than to increase the value of their firms5. Furthermore, when 
diversified firms are sold at a discount, insiders, who have superior knowledge about the 
value-decreasing diversification strategies, do not expect the diversification discount to 
disappear with the passage of time. Overall, assuming that insiders consider corporate 
diversification as a means to benefits themselves and not to increase firm value (i.e. 
when the agency effect dominates), we hypothesise that: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: The intensity of insider purchases is negatively related to the extent of 
corporate diversification.  
Hypothesis 2a: The intensity of insider purchases is negatively related to the level of 
diversification discount. 
 
Insider trading and the information effect of corporate diversification 
The above hypotheses are based on the agency effect of corporate diversification. 
However, as noted above, it could be argued that managers implement diversification 
                                                 
5
 It could be argued that diversification brings with it opportunities to further increase managerial 
perquisites, such as rewards packages, travel, office allowances, etc., the costs of which are borne by all 
shareholders (McConnell et al., 2010: 306). Consequently managers may have an incentive to hold 
significant numbers of shares in their own right to defend hostile takeover bids that are likely to imperil 
their perquisites (Morck et al., 1988). However, there is evidence that hostile takeovers are not primarily 
prompted by sub-optimal performance (Franks and Mayer, 1996), and are likely to be deterred by the size 
and diversification of the target company (Comment and Schwert, 2010). Hence, managers may use 
growth and diversification as a means of warding off hostile takeovers, without having to rely on the 
defence of personal shareholding (c.f. Morck et al., 1988). 
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strategies to increase firm value but, due to increased information asymmetries, 
outsiders are not able to assess the correct value of these strategies (i.e. the information 
effect). Here, insiders are likely to purchase shares of their own firms when they truly 
believe in the potential benefits of their diversification strategies, and when they expect 
the true value of diversification strategies to be revealed with the resolution of 
uncertainty surrounding these strategies over time and/or to signal their beliefs about the 
value of diversification. Moreover, corporate insiders may like to signal their beliefs 
about the value of diversification, especially when they perceive that outside investors 
undervalue the potential benefits of diversification strategies. They could do so by 
increasing the amount of disclosure about the operations and the linkages between 
different segments (see Hope et al., 2009), but this may. However, more disclosure may 
lead to a gradual deterioration in the competitive advantages brought about by corporate 
diversification (Edwards and Smith, 1996). An alternative and more credible signalling 
mechanism for corporate insiders to convey the information about the potential benefits 
of diversification strategies could be to purchase shares of their own firm in the open 
market that increases their exposure to firm-specific risk and to the outcomes of 
diversification strategies. Overall, assuming Hence, assumingthat the information effect 
of corporate diversification dominates, we propose the following two hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1b: The intensity of insider purchases is positively related to the extent of 
corporate diversification.  
Hypothesis 2b: The intensity of insider purchases is positively related to the level of 
diversification discount. 
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Here, hypothesis 1b is a competing hypothesis for hypothesis 1a, while hypothesis 2b is 
a competing hypothesis for 2a. It is important to note here that hypotheses 1a and 1b 
specify a link between the extent of corporate diversification and corporate insiders’ 
beliefs measured by the intensity of insider purchases without taking into account 
outsiders’ assessment of the diversification strategies in place. Hypotheses 2a and 2b, 
however, consider the link between that the intensity of insider purchases and potential 
(mis)valuation of diversification strategies by outside investors. 
 
2.3 – Corporate diversification and information conveyed by insider trading  
A substantial portion of the insider trading literature examines the consequences of 
information conveyed throughby insider trading, finding that insider purchases result in 
a significant and positive stock price reaction, while insider sales lead to a negative 
reaction  (e.g. c.f. Seyhun, 1986; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Fidrmuc et al., 2006). This 
evidence is substantial and quite consistent. In essence, the evidence suggests that 
insider purchases result in a significant and positive stock price reaction, while insider 
sales lead to a negative reaction (albeit not always a statistically significant one). This 
positive (negative) market reaction to purchases (sales) reflects the effect of corporate 
insiders’ favourable (unfavourable) value-relevant information being incorporated in the 
stock price6.  
 
Recent studies find that the magnitude of the stock market reaction to insider trading is 
contingent upon firm-specific characteristics that determine the level of information 
                                                 
6
 Further evidence on the information effect comes from insider trading around corporate events. For 
example, Hirschey and Zaima (1989) find that shareholders’ returns due to corporate asset sell-offs is 
related to the signals provided by the intensity of insider trading. Specifically, they find that stock price 
reaction to asset sell-offs is significantly positive when insiders are net purchasers prior to these deals. 
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asymmetries between corporate insiders and outside investors; the market reaction to 
insiders’ trades is likely to be higher for firms that are in possession of assets or 
strategies that are harder for outsiders to value (see, e.g. Coff and Lee, 2003). For 
example, smaller firms are found to have larger market reaction to insider trading (see, 
e.g. Seyhun, 1986; Jeng et al., 2001). This is attributed to insiders of smaller firms 
possessing a ‘significant portion of relevant information’, which is conveyed to the 
market through their trades (see Jeng et al., 2001: 464). Similarly, it is argued that, 
compared to insiders, outsiders are at a disadvantage in assessing the value of research 
and development (R&D) projects because these projects are “‘complex and tacit”’ (see 
Coff and Lee, 2003: 184; Aboody and Lev, 2001). Consequently, Coff and Lee (2003) 
suggest that the positive (negative) market reaction to insiders’ purchases (sales) is 
more positive (negative) for firms with R&D projects. 
 
Following the above literatureHence, we posit that the market reaction to insider trading 
is contingent upon the extent of corporate diversification; . Our point of departure is the 
argument that outsiders react to insider trading because they consider these trades to 
carry value-relevant information. Consequently, the extent of corporate diversification 
is likely to affect the market reaction to insider trading if it impacts onaffects the level 
of information asymmetries between corporate insider and outside investors. As we 
noted in section 2.1, corporate diversification could have two opposite effects on 
information asymmetries between insiders and outsiders. The transparency approach 
suggestshypothesis predicts t that corporate diversification exacerbates information 
asymmetries between insiders and outsiders, whilst t. In contrast, the information 
diversification approach holdshypothesis suggests that information asymmetries are 
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lower for diversified firms if outsiders’ valuation errors associated with individual 
segments of diversified firms are not perfectly positively correlated ((c.f. see Hadlock et 
al., 2001; Thomas, 2002). From this perspective, corporate insiders’ informational 
advantage over outsiders is diversified away when their firms operate in multiple lines 
of businesses (see Huson and Mackinnon, 2003). Overall, whether corporate 
diversification increases or decreases insiders’ informational advantage over outsiders 
depends on which effect (transparency effect or information diversification effect) 
dominates. If the transparency approach is correctcorporate diversification increases 
insiders’ informational advantage over outsiders by making firms less transparent to 
outsiders, then we expect that: 
  
Hypothesis 3a:  The information conveyed by insider trading is positively related to the 
extent of corporate diversification. 
 
However, if the information diversification approach is correct corporate diversification 
moderates insiders’ informational advantage over outsiders, the, then we expect that: 
 
Hypothesis 3b:  The information conveyed by insider trading is negatively related to 
the extent of corporate diversification. 
 
2.4 – Distinction between industrial and geographic diversification  
In the above sub-sections, we do not make any distinction between industrial and 
geographic diversification. However, it is essential to distinguish between industrial and 
geographic diversification if these two types of diversification differ in terms of 
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informational advantage that they provide to corporate insiders. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is an unexplored area. We conjecture that the level of information 
asymmetries between insiders and outsiders is likely to be smaller for geographical 
diversification than for industrial diversification. We provide two possible explanations 
this.  
 
First, while both types of diversification make firms less transparent to outsiders, ththe 
information diversification effect mayis likely to be stronger for geographically 
diversified firms. The explanation for this is as follows. Similar to industrially 
diversified firms, the valuation of geographically diversified firms depends on the 
prospects of different segments. The information diversification hypothesis posits that 
outsiders make valuation errors, which are less than perfectly positively correlated. 
Thus, the overall valuation errors are smaller for diversified firms. The information 
diversification effect may beis effect is p present for both industrially and 
geographically diversified firms. However, unlike firms that operate only in one 
country, the prospects of geographically diversified firms depend on economy-wide 
fluctuations inof different countries. Thus, for geographically diversified, outsiders are 
likely to make errors not only about different lines of businesses but also about 
fluctuations in different economies. If these economies and outsiders errors about these 
economies are less than perfectly positively correlated, then oOutsiders’ average 
valuation errors are likely to be smaller for geographically diversified compared to those 
for firms that operate only in one country.  
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Second, when firms diversify industrially, they move into new lines of business.  There 
are uncertainties associated with diversification. Both insiders and outsiders form 
expectations about the value of industrial diversification strategies. However, insiders, 
who obtain and evaluate information pertaining to each stage of industrial 
diversification, are likely to be in a better position to assess the value of diversification. 
When firms diversify geographically, there are uncertainties associated with the value 
relevance of this diversification. However, unlike pure industrial diversification, a major 
portion of uncertainties associated with geographic diversification is due to the foreign 
exchange risk, and host country’s political risk and regulatory risk (see Reeb et al., 
2002). It is unlikely that corporate insiders possess any special advantage over outside 
investors in assessing the value implications of these economy-wide risks (see Demsetz, 
1986). Consequently, the gap between insiders’ and outsiders’ information about 
geographic diversification mayis likely to b be smaller than that for industrial 
diversification.  
 
3 – Data and Methodology 
We rely on multivariate regression analysis to examine the link between insider trading 
and corporate diversification. Our dependent variables are various measures of insider 
trading (discussed below), and our focus variables (Leamer, 1983; Woodward, 2006) 
are various measures of corporate diversifications. In a multivariate regression setup, for 
results on the relationship between insider trading and corporate diversification to 
exhibit inferential and measurement robustness (see Leamer 1986; Woodward, 2006), 
we (1) control for other variables that are likely to affect insider trading (e.g. firm size, 
firm-specific risk) and check whether including or excluding various control variables 
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affect our results, (2) use alternative ways to model insider trading (e.g. using fixed-
effect panel data regressions, ordered probit model, fractional logit model, and zero-one 
inflated beta distribution), and (3) use alternative ways to measure insider trading and 
corporate diversification. If our key results regarding the link between our dependent 
variables (i.e. measures of insider trading) and our focus variables (i.e. measures of 
corporate diversification) fluctuate substantially, then our conclusions are likely to be 
fragile (Leamer, 1983).  
 
Without controlling for other variables, we may have omitted variable bias, especially if 
these variables are correlated with corporate diversification (Wooldridge, 2008). 
However, it is important to note that there is no consensus on which variables should be 
controlled for in our regressions and how these variables should be measured. For 
example, in Fidrmuc et al. (2006), firm size appears as the value of market capitalisation 
in some specifications and natural log of the number of employees in other. However, in 
all the US studies, firm size is usually natural log of market capitalisation or total assets. 
Firm-specific risk appears in regressions in Coff and Lee (2003) but not in other papers. 
R&D expenditure is considered as a key variable in insider trading literature, but does 
not appear in Fidrmuc et al. (2006). No recent study on insider trading controls for 
executive directors’ pay-performance sensitivity. Our strategy is to report results for the 
specifications including all variables for which data are available. We also try various 
combinations of these control variables. Our results about corporate diversification 
remain qualitatively same. These results are available from authors upon request. 
 
 
 17
 
3.1 – The measurement of corporate diversification and diversification discount 
Although conceptually it may be reasonably straightforward to distinguish a focused 
firm from a diversified firm, the actual measurement of the extent corporate 
diversification is very difficult. To the best of our knowledge, almost all empirical 
studies that examine issues related to corporate diversification using a large sample of 
firms utilise segment level accounting data reported by public listed firms (see 
Sambharya, 2000; Martin and Sayrak, 2003). These studies use business count method, 
Herfindahl index, or the entropy index (see Jaquemin and Berry, 1979).  
 
The alternative strategic measure of diversification (, which is very subjective and 
depends on the researchers’ judgment) (see Martin and Sayrak, 2003, p.49), is relatively 
less is somewhat less  popular and used only when the sample size (firms and time 
periods) is relatively small. Comparing the validity of various measures of corporate 
diversification, Sambharya (2000: 1972) recommends “‘the entropy measure as the 
primary measure for researchers to consider due to its technical rigour, strong 
theoretical base, and lack of subjectivity and its relatively minor shortcomings”’. 
Another advantage of entropy measures is that Iit also enables us to decompose 
diversification into related and unrelated diversification; other measures (e.g. Herfindhal 
index) do not offer such decomposition (see Jaquemin and Berry, 1979). Following 
Sambharya (2000) and a large number of empirical studies, our primary measure of 
corporate diversification is the entropy index. However, we do check the robustness of 
our results by using Herfindhal index as an alternative measure of diversification, with 
qualitatively similar results. Our results are qualitatively similar.   
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The calculation of entropy is based on segmental data reported by public listed firms. 
Public firms in the UK follow the Statement of Standard Accounting Practice No. 25 
(SSAP 25)7 for segmental reporting. In the US, segmental reporting by public firms is 
based on the SFAS 131, which superseded the SFAS 14 in 19978 (see, e.g. Rajan et al., 
2000; Jiraporn et al., 2008)9. According to the UK accounting standards, the purpose of 
segmental reporting is “‘to assist users of financial statement (a) to appreciate more 
thoroughly the results and financial positions of the entity…; and (b) to be aware of the 
impact that changes in significant components of a business may have on the business 
as a whole”’ (SSAP 25; p. 2). The aim of the segmental reporting standard followed by 
US firms is very similar (see SFAS 131, pp. 4-5).  
 
The difficulty in measuring the extent of corporate diversification using reported 
segment data arises because the accounting standards, especially SSAP 25, provide 
corporate insiders (directors) substantial discretion in terms of how data pertaining to 
industrial and geographical segments are presented to outsiders. A reportable segment 
according to the SSAP 25 is one whose turnover, profit or net assets are 10% or more of 
the corresponding total values of its parent firm (SSAP 25: pp. 3-4). However, the 
standard is not very rigid regarding the identification of ‘classes of business’ and 
‘geographic areas’ in which firms operate. Instead, the standard allows directors to use 
their own judgment to determine the classes of business and geographic regions so in a 
way that the reported data helps outsiders to assess the risk and development 
                                                 
7
 http://www.frc.org.uk/asb/technical/standards/pub0389.html 
8
 http://www.fasb.org/st/#fas150 
9
 We do not consider the implications of IFRS 8, which came into effect in 2009. Also, IAS 14 is rarely 
used by UK firms for segmental reporting (see Prather-Kinsey and Meek, 2004). 
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opportunities facing their firms. The standard also allows “‘non-disclosure of segment 
data if, in the opinion of the directors (managers), this is seriously prejudicial to the 
wellbeing of the enterprise”’ (Emmanuel and Garrod, 2002: 218). 
 
The SFAS 131 in the US recommends the so-called management approach to 
segmental reporting that requires firms to provide information relating to operating 
segments that the top management uses for its decision making (see the SFAS 131, pp. 
7-8). The identification of a reportable segment in the US differs from that in the UK. 
The SFAS 131 considers reportable segments (operating segments) as entities that 
parent firms earn revenue from or incur expenses on, and that are regularly reviewed by 
the management (pp. 21-22). US firms are required to report data for segments whose 
sales, profit or assets are 10% or more of the corresponding total values of their parent 
firm. Unlike the corresponding accounting standard in the UK, the SFAS 131 may 
provide more disaggregated data on segments. For example, US firms are required to 
provide data for segments operating in different countries given that sales in these 
countries are material (e.g. 10% of the total sales). However, if sales are not material, 
then firms can aggregate countries into regions. Consequently, the number of segments 
disclosed by firms may actually increase or decrease under the SFAS 131 (see Hope et 
al., 2009). A key feature of the segmental reporting standard in the US is that it requires 
firms to use mechanisms to identify reportable segments in a way that are “‘consistent 
with those used for internal evaluation (Harris, 1998: 112)”’. The UK standard does not 
explicitly make this requirement. This distinction between the SFAS 131 and the SSAP 
25 could make segmental reporting in the US more detailed and informative. However, 
to the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical work to substantiate this claim.  
 20
 
Although the reported segmental data enables researches to construct diversification 
measures for a large sample of firms, the measurement using this data may not 
accurately capture the extent of corporate diversification. For example, for reporting 
purposes, firms may ‘combine two or more activities that are vertically or otherwise 
related into a single segment’ or may ‘sometimes change the segments they report when 
there is no real underlying change in their operations’ (Martin and Sayrak, 2003: 47). In 
the UK, the SSAP 25 requires directors to review their reportable segments on an 
annual basis. A segment that only constitutes 9% of sales (or net assets) in a particular 
year may or may not be reported in that year. But, if the sales of this particular segment 
are 10% of total sales in the following year, directors are required to report it separately. 
However, it may be difficult to justify that because of a slight increase in sales of a 
particular segment relative to other segments, the firm has become more diversified. 
The problem of measuring diversification using segment data is further exacerbated 
when firms aggregate countries into regions. For example, some companies may bunch 
sales in Americas, while others may report North and South American sales 
separately10. This problem may be less severe in US firms following the SFAS 131 that 
requires material countries to be reported separately. However, according to the SSAP 
25, segments can be reported for geographical regions that combine different countries. 
It is possible that some firms appear more diversified because of more detailed 
disclosure, while others are equally diversified but offer less detailed disclosure. We 
hope to capture this unobserved firm heterogeneity using firm-specific fixed effects in 
our regression analysis (see Rajan et al., 2001).  
                                                 
10
 We thank an anonymous referee for this point.  
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The strategic approach to the measurement of corporate diversification may provide 
more refined, albeit very subjective, measures of corporate diversification by a thorough 
reading of annual reports and other disclosures by firms and by asking directors to 
provide more information (via questionnaires or interviews, for example) about the 
diversity of their firms’ operations (e.g. Pehrsson, 2006). However, it is unlikely that 
detailed information will be disclosed disclosed, given that more disclosure regarding 
segments may lead to a gradual deterioration in the competitive advantages brought 
about by corporate diversification (Edwards and Smith, 1996; Hayes and Lundholm, 
1996). Moreover, given that our sample period is from 1996-2006, it is virtually 
impossible to construct a measure of diversification based on a questionnaire. 
Consequently, like a large number of existing published studies, most recent being that 
by Hautz et al. (2011, this journal), we rely on segment level data to measure the extent 
of corporate diversification. However, by doing this, our study faces the same 
limitations that earlier studies face, and, hence, our results should be interpreted with 
caution.  
 
We measure diversification using the entropy index calculated on the basis of segment-
level sales data (see Clarke et al., 2004; Hautz et al., 2011). The industrial entropy index 
itENTIND _  for firm i in year t is calculated as follows:   
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where Pjit is the percentage of firm sales generated in industry segment j in year t (four-
digit SIC code) and the summation is over the n industry segments in which the firm i 
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operates at the beginning of year. The entropy index for geographical diversification is 
calculated using reported sales data for geographical segments. A larger value of the 
entropy index indicates a higher level of corporate diversification.   
 
A key benefit of using the entropy index is that it enables us to distinguish between 
related and unrelated corporate diversification. This distinction is important because, as 
suggested by the theoretical and empirical literature (see Palich et al., 2000), the agency 
effect of diversification is likely to be stronger in the case of unrelated corporate 
diversification. Moreover, when firms diversify in unrelated areas, they are likely to 
reduce firm-specific risk through corporate diversification. This is important in the 
context of this paper because, as we argued earlier, insiders take on more firm-specific 
risk when they purchase shares of their own firms. Thus, it is important to examine 
whether the impact of unrelated diversification is any different from that of total 
diversification. We measure unrelated diversification by calculating the entropy 
measure of the degree to which a firm’s sales are generated among unrelated segments 
using Fama-French 49 industry groups11. Specifically, the unrelated entropy index 
itENTUN _  for firm i in year t is calculated as follows: 
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where Pgit is the percentage of firm sales generated by industry group g in year t (using 
Fama-French 49 industry groups) and the summation is over the k industry groups in 
which the firm i operates at the beginning of year (Clarke et al., 2004). We do not report 
                                                 
11
 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/    
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results for related diversification as related entropy is simply industrial entropy minus 
unrelated entropy.  
 
 
 3.2 – The measurement of insider trading 
Insiders’ willingness to purchase shares of their firms  
We model insiders’ willingness to purchase in two ways. First, we measure the intensity 
of insider purchases for firm i in year t with purchase ratio (PRit), which is the number 
of shares purchased by insiders of a firm in a calendar year divided by total number of 
shares traded by insiders of that firm in that year (see Piotroski and Roulstone, 2005). 
Higher purchase ratio means that insiders buy more shares than they sell. This ratio 
measures corporate insiders’ willingness to buy shares of their firms on the basis of 
their beliefs about the prospects of their firms and/or their perception about outsiders’ 
misevaluation of their firms. Within the context of this paper, we expect purchase ratio 
to be high if insiders consider corporate diversification to be value enhancing and/or if 
they perceive that outsiders misvalue the diversification strategies in place.  
 
The above analysis is useful in linking purchase ratio and corporate diversification. 
However, it is important to note that our dependent variable is a proportion that lies in 
the interval [0,1], with a large number of our sample purchase ratios being either 1 or 0 
as in Piotroski and Roulstone (2005). Consequently, to capture nonlinearities in the data 
and to avoid fitted values falling out of the closed interval in which the dependent 
variable lies (Ferrari and Cribari-Neto, 2004; Papke and Wooldridge, 2008), we utilise 
three alternative modelling strategies, namely, ordered probit model (Davidson and 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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Mackinnon, 2004), fractional logit model (Papke and Wooldridge, 2008), and zero-one 
inflated-beta distribution model12. Due to space constraint and to make our results 
comparable to existing studies, we only provide results for our linear model with panel 
data fixed-effects estimation and for ordered probit models. Our results regarding the 
link between the intensity of insider purchases and corporate diversification using the 
fractional logit and zero-one inflated beta distribution are in line with those presented in 
the paper. These results are available upon request.  
 
For ordered probit model, we follow Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) and use the 
purchase ratio to construct an ordinal variable that takes on the value of 0 when 
purchase ratio is equal to 0 (i.e. insider only sell shares of their firms); 1 when purchase ratio is 
in the interval (0,0.5) (i.e. insiders sell more than they purchase); 2 when purchase ratio is in the 
interval [0.5,1) (i.e. insiders purchase more shares than they sell; and 3 when purchase ratio is 
equal to 1 (i.e. insiders only purchase shares of their firms). This ordinal variable attempts to 
measure “‘insider consensus”’ (see Piotroski and Roulstone, 2005) about corporate 
diversification strategies. That is, if insiders are very confident about their diversification 
strategies and believe that outsiders undervalue their strategies, then they are very likely to 
purchase more than they sell (so the ordinal variable is likely to be 2 or 3). However, if insiders 
are less optimistic about the value relevance of their strategies of their firms, then they are more 
likely to sell (so the ordinal variable is likely to be 0 or 1).  
 
Information conveyed by insider trading to outside investors  
                                                 
12
 We are very grateful to Maarten Buis for his detailed advice on the use of zero-one inflated beta 
distribution for proportions with multiple 0s and 1s. See: 
http://www.maartenbuis.nl/presentations/berlin10.pdf 
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We measure the information content of insider trading by estimating the abnormal 
returns around directors’ daily net purchases and net sales using the standard event-
study methodology based on the one-factor market model. The factor used is the return 
on the FTSE All Share Index. The estimation period for the parameters of the one-factor 
market model is 180 trading days (−200, −21) relative to the notification date for 
directors’ trades. Following the existing studies on the inside trading in the UK, we 
focus on a short event window around insider trading (e.g. Fidrmuc et al., 2006)13. Our 
main results are based on 3-days cumulative abnormal returns (CAR(-1,1)) because as 
in earlier studies (e.g. Fidrmuc et al., 2006) we assume that the market responds to the 
information content of insiders’ transactions immediately. However, it could be argued 
that market is slow to respond to the information contained in insiders’ trades. 
Therefore, we check the robustness of our results using slightly longer event windows 
(4-days and 5-days).   
 
3.3 – Other factors affecting insider trading 
In our multivariate regressions, we control for firm size (SIZEt-1) measured by the 
natural log of total book value of assets at the beginning of year. Following the existing 
literature, we expect larger firms to have lower information asymmetries (see Jeng et al., 
2001). We also expect firms with R&D expenditure to have higher information 
asymmetries than firms without R&D expenditure (see Coff and Lee, 2003). To 
distinguish between R&D and non-R&D firms, we use a dummy variable (R&Dt-1) that 
                                                 
13
 Existing studies based on the US data such as Jeng et al. (2003) and Huddart and Ke (2007), however, 
measure the six-month cumulative abnormal return. Our choice of the announcement abnormal returns, 
similar to other studies based on the UK data such as Fidrmuc et al. (2006), reflects the speed of trade 
reporting, which is at most six days in the UK, compared to around 40 days in the US. Further, insiders in 
the US ‘must disgorge profits attributable to offsetting purchases and sales that occur within six months 
of each other’ (Huddart and Ke, 2007: 200) whereas insiders in the UK are not subject to this regulation. 
See Fidrmuc et al. (2006) for a comparison of the UK and UK regulations on insider trading. 
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takes value 1 if the firm’s R&D expenditure measured at the beginning of year is greater than 
zero and 0 otherwise. We also control firm leverage (LEVt-1) because higher leverage 
may result in better monitoring by debt holders, which, in turn, may reduce the level of 
information asymmetries (see Harris and Raviv, 1992). 
 
Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) find that insider trading embodies both contrarian 
beliefs (i.e. trading against investor sentiment) and superior information about their 
future cash flow. Following Piotroski and Roulstone (2005), we use the book-to-market 
ratio (BMt) and the 12-month buy-and-hold market-adjusted return (RETt) at the end of 
fiscal year to control for the contrarian beliefs. We also include a dummy variable 
(GDROAt+1) that takes value 1 if the value of next year net income before extraordinary 
items scaled by total book value of assets is greater than the corresponding value for this 
year and 0 otherwise. This dummy variable attempts to control for insiders’ superior 
knowledge about future performance.  
 
We also control for firm-specific (idiosyncratic) risk in our regressions. The key 
rationale for controlling for firm-specific risk is that the informational advantage that 
insiders possess is related to factors that affect their own firms’ prospects and not about 
factors that affect a large number of firms in the economy (see Demsetz, 1986). By 
buying their own firms’ shares, corporate insiders bear higher firm-specific risk, given 
that their human capital is already invested in their firms. However, as Demsetz (1986) 
points out, this firm-specific risk is also a source of benefits from insider trading.  
Consequently, insiders purchase more only if their favourable information about their 
firms’ prospects outweighs the cost of additional non-diversifiable risk. Controlling for 
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firm-specific risk is particularly important for our empirical analysis because the extent 
of corporate industrial (geographic) diversification is likely to be negatively (positively) 
related to firm-specific risk (Luabtkin and Chatterjee, 1994; Reeb et al., 1998). Thus, by 
not controlling for firm-specific risk, our regression analysis is likely to suffer from 
omitted variable bias (Wooldridge, 2008).  We measure firm-specific risk (Firm_Riskt-1) 
as the standard deviation of daily returns for 180 days prior to the first day of the year 
on which an insider trades (see Coff and Lee, 2003). For example, if the first insider 
trade for firm XYZ plc is on the 1st of June, 2000, then standard deviation is calculated 
using daily data for 180 days prior to this date14. For our regressions for the market 
reaction to insider trading, we also include Multiple_Purchase (Multiple_Sales) dummy 
variable that equal 1 when more than one director purchase (sell) shares on a particular 
day (see Fidrmuc et al., 2006). In our section on robustness checks, we also examine the 
link between corporate diversification and insider trading after controlling for 
executives’ pay-performance sensitivity.  
 
3.4 – Data description and sample characteristics 
Our empirical analysis is based on directors’ trading data obtained from Hemmington 
Scott and accounting and financial data from Datastream. Data on stock-based 
incentives (executive options and long-term incentive shares) are hand collected from 
annual reports. The original insider trading file from Hemmington Scott contains 
                                                 
14
 In results not reported in the paper, we also used an alternative measure of firm-specific risk based on 
residuals from the market model (see Clarkson and Simunic, 1994). The market model was estimated 
daily returns for 180 days. For each firm year, the time period for the market model is 180 days before the 
first day of the year in which a corporate insider of that firm trades. For example, if the first insider trade 
of firm A is on the 1st of January 1999, then market model is estimated using daily returns data for 180 
days leading to the 1st of January 1999. If the first insider trade of firm A is on the 1st of June 1999, then 
market model is estimated using daily returns data for 180 days leading to the 1st of June 1999. The factor 
used for the market model is the returns on FTSE All Share Index. The results are available from the 
authors upon request.  
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104,782 open market trades between January 1995 and March 2007. We delete 2,609 
transactions where the trader is not a corporate insider (i.e. executive or non-executive 
director) and 1,656 transactions for which dates for insider transactions are not 
available. Following earlier studies we exclude insiders’ sales after the exercise of 
options because these transactions are less likely to convey insiders’ value relevant 
information to the market (Fidrmuc et al., 2006: 2942). We exclude 17,637 transactions 
for firms in financial services and 17,656 transactions for firms that could not be located 
in Datastream. We then delete 3,708 transactions before January 1996 and 20 
transactions between January 2007 and March 2007. We exclude transactions for firms 
that do not have relevant accounting and financial data for the main regressions 
available in Datastream. We then aggregate the insider transactions at two levels. First, 
we aggregate trades annually to calculate purchase ratio for each firm year for all 
directors, for executive directors and for non-executive directors15. Second, we 
aggregate trades daily to calculate daily net purchases (and net sales) for all directors, 
for executive directors and for non-executive directors. The stock market reaction is 
calculated around these net purchases and net sales. At the annual level, our final 
sample contains 4,937 firm-years purchase ratios. At the daily level, our final sample 
contained 15,523 net daily purchases and 4,264 daily net sales. Our sample size is 
reduced for the regressions involving diversification discount due to data availability. 
Sample sizes for each director group (e.g. all directors, executive directors, and non-
executive directors) are reported in the relevant tables.       
 
                                                 
15
 We also conducted our analysis separately for transactions by CEOs. The results were qualitatively 
similar to those obtained for trades of executive directors. For brevity, we do not report results based only 
on CEO trades.   However, a copy of these results is available from the authors on request. 
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Table 1 describes variables used in our empirical analysis. Panel A of Table 2 compares 
diversified (i.e. multi-segment) firm-years and focused (i.e. single-segment) firm-years 
on the basis of various firm-specific variables, while Panel B reports the correlation 
matrix for these variables. Multi-segment firms in our sample are significantly larger 
and spend significantly more on R&D than single-segment firms. Multi-segment firms 
also have significantly higher leverage than single-segment firms. This is consistent 
with the view that diversified firms have larger debt capacity due to the co-insurance 
effect (see Llewellyn, 1971).  
 
Industrially diversified firms have lower firm-specific risk than single-segment firms. 
However, geographical diversification seems to increase firm-specific risk. This 
observation is consistent with the idea that firms take on more risk when they diversify 
internationally perhaps due to exchange rate risk, lack of information about foreign 
markets, political risk, and so forth (see Reeb et al., 1998). This observation once again 
highlights the importance of distinguishing between industrial and geographic 
diversification in the context of information asymmetries between outside investors and 
corporate insiders, where latter are expected to benefit more from the informational 
advantage when firm-specific risk is high. Multi-segment firms in our sample do not 
have higher 12-month buy-and-hold market-adjusted return or better future performance 
compared to single-segment firms. The mean industrial and geographical entropy 
measures of multiple-segment firm-years are 0.588 and 0.778, respectively. The mean 
unrelated entropy measure is 0.388, which is about 66% of the mean industrial entropy, 
suggesting a high level of unrelated diversification by firms in our sample.     
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
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4 – Empirical Results  
4.1 – Corporate diversification and insider trading – Univariate analysis  
We report means of the purchase ratios, the number of trades by directors and the 
abnormal returns around directors’ trades in Table 3. In each of the four panels we 
compare single-segment firm-years with low-diversification firm-years (i.e. firm-years 
for which entropy is below the sample median) and high-diversification firm-years (i.e. 
firm-years for which entropy is above the sample median). The entropy measures are for 
total industrial diversification, unrelated industrial diversification and geographical 
diversification. Purchase ratios, the number of trades and the abnormal returns are 
reported for directors, executive directors and non-executive directors.  
  
 
Panel A shows that mean purchase ratio for single-segment firms is significantly lower 
than that for diversified firms, whilst the . Also, the number of purchase (sale) 
transactions are significantly larger (smaller) for more diversified firms.  Moreover, 
results in Panels C and D suggest a positive (negative) market reaction to directors’ net 
purchases (sales) for all groups of firms. This is consistent with the existing literature on 
insider trading (e.g. Fidrmuc et al., 2006). However, no clear picture emerges regarding 
the relationship between the abnormal returns around insider trading and the extent of 
corporate diversification. It is evident that the CARs around insiders’ net purchases are 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
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significantly higher for single-segment firms compared to those for diversified firms. 
However, there is no clear difference in the CARs around net sales. In summary, our 
univariate for CARs provide some support for Hypothesis 3b. That is, the market 
reaction around insiders’ net purchases is higher for single-segment firms compared to 
that for diversified firms.  
 
Overall, our univariate results for purchase ratios provide evidence in favour of 
Hypothesis 1b (i.e. the intensity of insider purchases increases with corporate 
diversification), while our results for CARs provide some support for Hypothesis 3b. 
However, these univariate test should be interpreted with caution given that they do not 
enable us to examine the relationship between insider trading measures (purchases ratio 
and CARs) and corporate diversification by holding constant other firm-specific 
variables that may be related to insider trading. The multivariate analysis in the next 
section will address this issue.   
  
4.2 – Corporate diversification and the intensity of insider trading – Multivariate 
analysis 
Table 4 reports results from the fixed-effect panel data regressions and for ordered 
probit model for all directors. Our focus variables are the entropy measures of total 
industrial diversification, unrelated industrial diversification and geographical 
diversification. The coefficients of industrial (total and unrelated) entropy measures are 
positive and statistically significant. The p-values for related and unrelated entropy are 
0.001 and 0.012, respectively, for fixed-effect regressions. The results are even more 
statistically significant for the ordered probit regressions. All our control variables, 
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except firm size, have expected signs. The coefficients for firm size is positive in fixed-
effect model but negative in ordered probit. However, it is important to note that size is 
statistically insignificant in both models, and does not change our results regarding the 
link between dependent and focus variables16. Overall, the effect of total and unrelated 
industrial diversification holds even after controlling for other variables. These results 
suggest that insiders purchase more than they sell when industrial diversification is 
high. This is consistent with our Hypothesis 1b.  
 
Our results also suggest that there is no significant relationship between the intensity of 
insider purchases and geographic diversification. This indicates that the intensity of 
insider purchases, while associated with industrial diversification, is not related to 
geographic diversification. This is consistent with our discussion in section 2.4, which 
suggests that insiders’ informational advantage is greater for industrial diversification 
than for geographic diversification.  
 
 
Some recent studies on insider trading propose the ‘information hierarchy hypothesis’, 
which that  suggests that executive directors, who are closer to their firms’ operations 
than non-executive directors, may have more value-relevant information about the 
prospects of their firms (e.g. Seyhun, 1986; Fidrmuc et al., 2006). In Table 5 we 
examine whether the link between industrial diversification and purchase ratio holds for 
different categories of directors. The fixed-effect model suggests that the coefficients 
for the entropy measures of total and unrelated industrial diversification are statistically 
                                                 
16
 We also tried a model that does not exclude firm size. Results regarding insider trading and corporate 
diversification are qualitatively same.  
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
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significant only for non-executive directors. It appears that the intensity of purchases of 
executive directors, who are closer to the operations of their firms than non-executive 
directors, does not increase with the level of corporate diversification. However, as 
noted earlier, given the nature of our dependent variable (i.e. a proportion bound in the 
interval [0,1]), linear regression model may not be appropriate. Our results from ordered 
probit model suggests coefficient for both executive and non-executive directors are 
statistically significant. Our results from fractional logit model and zero-one inflated 
beta distribution, not reported in the paper17, also suggest that executive directors’ 
intensity of purchases is positively related to the extent of corporate diversification.  
 
Another interesting observation is that the coefficient for geographical diversification 
for non-executive directors. If we are willing to accept 10% significance level, then this 
the coefficient for geographical diversification for non-executive directors result 
suggests that non-executive directors’ intensity to purchase shares of their firms 
increases with the level of geographic diversification; there is no significant relationship 
between executive directors’ purchases and geographic diversification. One possible 
explanation for this difference is that unlike executive directors, non-executive directors 
in the UK do not receive considerable exposure to their firms’ equity via their 
compensation packages (see Conyon et al., 2011). Consequently, if non-executive 
directors consider geographic diversification strategies to be value-enhancing, they will 
purchase more of their firms’ shares in the open market. Moreover, given the lack of 
economic integration among countries (Rodrik, 2000), geographic diversification may 
enable non-executive to further diversify their portfolios 18.  
                                                 
17
 A copy of results is available from the authors on request. 
18
 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for this explanation.  
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4.3 – Diversification discount and the intensity of insider trading – Multivariate 
analysis 
This section examines the link between the intensity of insider purchases and 
diversification discount. WeWe  calculate the diversification discount for our diversified 
firms using the method outlined in Berger and Ofek (1995). The excess value 
(EX_VALUEit), a measure of discount, for firm i in year t is calculated as the natural log 
of the ratio of the firm’s actual value to the sum of the imputed values of its segments. 
The imputed value of each segment is equal to the segment’s sales multiplied by its 
industry median capital to sales ratio (see Berger and Ofek, 1995). The industry median 
capital to sales ratio for a segment operating in a particular industry is the median 
capital to sales ratio of all single-segment firms operating in that industry. For example, 
for a segment operating in agriculture sector, median capital to sales ratio is the median 
of capital to sales ratio of single-segment firms operating in that sector. We use Fama-
French 49 industry groups for our analysis. Using the SIC codes of segments of 
diversified firms, we are able to identify standalone single-segment firms for segments 
of 2,281 firm-years. The mean excess value for this sample is -0.331. The negative 
excess value confirms the presence of diversification discount highlighted in Lins and 
Servaes (1999).  
 
Table 6 reports results from the fixed-effect panel data regressions and ordered probit 
models. Our focus variable is EX_VALUEit. We find a negative and statistically 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
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significant coefficient of the excess value for all directors suggesting that the intensity 
of insiders’ purchases is increasing in the level of diversification discount. This finding 
is consistent with our hypothesis 2b and provides further support for the argument that 
insiders consider diversification strategies to be value enhancing, especially when 
outside investors undervalue these strategies. A very interesting finding is that the link 
between insider trading and diversification discount is primarily due to executive 
directors. Perhaps executive directors, who are closer to their firms’ operations, are in a 
better position than non-executives, to know the true value relevance of diversification 
strategies, and, hencethus, they buy significantly more when outsiders’ undervaluation 
is high. These results are consistent with the information hierarchy hypothesis.   
 
 
4.4 – Corporate diversification and the market reaction to insider trading – 
Multivariate analysis  
In this section we employ multivariate regressions to examine the association between 
the market reaction around directors’ transactions and the level of corporate 
diversification, taking into account several factors that are not controlled for in the 
univariate analysis. It is important to note here that insider purchases are expected to 
convey favourable information to outsiders, while insider sales are expected to convey 
unfavourable information. Thus, if a smaller firms (or firms with R&D) have higher 
information asymmetries, then we expect positive (negative) information conveyed by 
insider purchases (sales) to be more positive (more negative) for smaller firm (for firms 
with R&D) (Coff and Lee 2003). Coff and Lee (2003) find such opposite effect of R&D 
on the market reaction to insider purchases and sales. Thus, when we examine the 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
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relationship between firm characteristics such as R&D and firm size, we may obtain 
opposite signs for the market reaction to insider purchases and insider sales19. It is also 
important to note that tThe existing literature suggests that insiders’ sales may be 
motivated by liquidity or diversification needs, and, thus, convey less information than 
insiders’ purchases (see Jeng et al., 2001; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Coff and Lee, 
2003; Fidrmuc et al., 2006). Thus, our primary focus is on the market reaction to insider 
purchases. However, we do provide all the corresponding results for insiders’ sales for 
completeness. 
 
Table 7 reports results from the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with the 
cumulative abnormal returns CAR(-1,1) around daily net purchases by all directors as 
the dependent variable in specifications (1) and (2), CAR(-1,1) around daily net 
purchases by executive directors in specifications (3) and (4), and CAR(-1,1) around 
daily net purchases by non-executive directors in specifications (5) and (6). In 
specifications (1) and (2), the coefficients for total entropy and unrelated entropy are 
positive and significant with p-values of 0.008 and 0.003, respectively. These results 
indicate that that the higher the level of industrial diversification, higher the market 
reaction to insider purchases. Our results for specifications 3-4 suggests that industrial 
diversification (total and unrelated) is also significantly positively related to the market 
reaction around executive directors’ purchases. However, for non-executive directors, 
the market reaction to purchases is significantly related to unrelated industrial 
diversification only. Thus, our findings support hypothesis 3a. Moreover, there is some 
evidence that unrelated diversification creates higher information asymmetries.   
                                                 
19
 A recent study multiplies reaction to sales by -1 to obtain same signs for firm-specific characteristics 
(see Betzer and Thiessen, 2009) 
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As in our regression analysis for the intensity of insider purchases, we find that the 
impact of geographic diversification on CAR is different from that of industrial 
diversification. We find that the entropy measure of geographical diversification is 
significantly negatively related to the market reaction to directors’ purchases. This again 
is consistent with idea that informational advantage provided to insiders by industrial 
diversification is greater than that by geographic diversification; indeed. In fact, our 
results suggest that geographical diversification reduces information asymmetry. It 
appears that the information diversification effect dominates theany  transparency effect 
for geographic diversification. Another potential explanation is that our measure of 
geographic diversification captures the quality of disclosure in the sense that firms that 
appear to be more diversified are those which provide more detailed information about 
their international operations.  Consequently, the market reaction is lower for these 
firms because these firms exhibit lower information asymmetries. . 
 
The coefficient of SIZEt-1 is negative and statistically significant, which is consistent 
with the notion that information asymmetries are higher for smaller firms (Seyhun, 
1986; Fidrmuc et al., 2006; Huddart and Ke, 2007). The coefficients of R&D 
expenditure are statistically insignificant. The coefficients of Firm_Riskt-1 for all 
specifications are positive and highly significant. This suggests that the market reaction 
is increasing in the level of firm-specific risk. It appears that the market takes into 
account how much firm-specific risk insiders are bearing when they buy shares of their 
own firms (c.f. Demsetz 1986).. This result is consistent with Demsetz’s (1986) 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
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suggestion that firms with higher firm-specific risk offers greater opportunities to 
benefit from insider trading.  
 
 
Table 8 presents results from the multivariate regressions with the cumulative abnormal 
returns CAR(-1,1) around insiders’ sales as the dependent variable. The coefficients of 
all the entropy measures of industrial and geographical diversification are not 
statistically significant different from zero. This finding is consistent with the result of 
the univariate analysis reported in Panel C of Table 3. Following the existing literature, 
we argue that sales transactions are motivated by directors’ liquidity needs rather than 
their informational advantage, and, therefore, the market reaction to these trades is not 
significantly related to firm-specific characteristics that determine the level of 
information asymmetries between insiders and outsiders.  
 
4.5 –The robustness checks  
4.5.1 – Controlling for the impact of pay-performance sensitivity  
The insider trading literature has long argued that managers trade shares of their own 
firms to benefit from their informational advantage. An important argument in this 
literature is that insider trading can be considered as an alternative, and perhaps more 
appropriate, way of compensating managers (see Manne, 2005). Comparing the 
executive stock options and insider trading, Manne (2005) argues that the latter enables 
corporate insiders to “‘craft their own reward for innovations almost as soon as they 
occur and to trade without harm to any investors”’ (Manne, 2005: 7). If managers stock 
based compensation package is closely linked to their efforts, then their incentives for 
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
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using insider trading as a mechanism to reward themselves are likely to be lower. 
Consequently, we expect negative relationship between the managers’ pay-performance 
sensitivity (defined below) and the intensity of insider purchases20. We re-run our main 
regressions for the intensity of insider purchases by specifically controlling for pay-
performance sensitivity.  
 
Controlling for pay-performance sensitivity is important because corporate 
diversification, the main focus of our study, is likely to be linked to benefits that 
managers derive from their firms. It is argued that corporate diversification increases the 
information-processing task that the management faces (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 
1989) and places more demands on management, which, in turn, needs to be reflected in 
terms of reward systems (Henderson and Fredrickson, 1996). Gomez-Mejia (1992) 
argues that management compensation should be designed to ensure that the extent of a 
firm’s diversification really improves its performance. Moreover, corporate 
diversification provides benefits to insiders in terms of a reduction in risk associated 
with their human capital (Amihud and Lev, 1981).  
  
The calculation for pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) follows Brick et al. (2011). Our 
measure of PPS includes executive share ownership, stock options, and long-term 
incentive shares. The measurement of PPS is very challenging for UK firms because the 
data on stock-based incentives, including stock options and long-term incentive plans, is 
not available in electronic format. Moreover, the way firms report/tabulate stock-based 
incentives in their annual reports is not similar, making data extraction extremely 
                                                 
20
 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the use of PPS in our analysis.  
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difficult and time consuming (see Conyon et al., 2011). Thus, existing studies on PPS in 
UK firms use only a limited number of observations. Even recent studies focusing 
entirely on executive compensation are based on the compensation data on a limited 
number of UK firms. For example, Conyon et al. (2011) compares US and UK 
compensation using only two years of data for around 200 UK firms. Given this 
constraint, we hand collecte data on stock-based incentives for all firms in our sample 
for 2004 to calculate PPS. After reading relevant sections of 433 annual reports, we are 
able to obtain complete information to calculate options deltas for 299 firms. The stock 
ownership data for these firms is obtained from HemmingtonScott. Delta for executive 
stock options is measured using Black-Scholes model, while delta for long-term 
incentive shares and existing ownership is taken as 1 (see Brick et al., 2011). The PPS 
measure for 2004 is used for regression analysis for insider trading for the period 2004-
2006. Our earlier analysis without PPS is based on the period 1996-2006. 
 
Our key results remain qualitatively unchanged even after controlling for the pay-
performance sensitivity. Note that only the coefficient of the entropy measure of 
unrelated industrial diversification remains statistically significant in both specifications 
while the coefficient of the entropy measure of geographical diversification is 
significant in the specification for executive directors. This is not surprising given that 
our sample size is drastically reduced with very little variation in the independent 
variables because we have multiple trade events for firms with same independent 
variable in our regression models.  
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4.5.2 – Alternative measure of corporate diversification 
As discussed in section 3.1, various measures of corporate diversification are utilised in 
the literature. Thomas (2002) uses Herfindhal index to examine the link between 
corporate diversification and information asymmetries. However, Thomas (2002) does 
mention that results remain unchanged with entropy. Following the existing litetruare 
(see Sambharya, 2000), oOur preferred measure of diversification is entropy because it 
enables us to decompose diversificationtciaon  into related and unrelated diversification 
(Sambharya 2000).  , wWe check the robustness of our previously reported results using 
Herfindahl index calculated on the basis of industrial (geographical) segment level sales 
data (see Barnes and Hardie-Brown, 2006). The industrial Herfindahl index for firm i in 
year t is calculated as follows (see Thomas, 2002: 380): 
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where n is the number of reported industrial segments of firm i in year t. Sjit is total sales 
for industrial segment j of firm i in year t. The Herfindahl index for geographical 
diversification is calculated in a similar manner. The Herfindahl index ranges from 0 to 
1, where 1 represents a focused firm. A smaller value of Herfindahl index indicates a 
higher level of corporate diversification. The results, which are reported in Table 8 
using the purchase ratio in specification (1) and the CAR(-1,1) to insider purchases and 
sales in specifications (2) and (3), respectively, are consistent with the result reported in 
Tables 4, 6 and 7 using the entropy measures of diversification.  
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4.5.3 – Alternative measures of the purchase intensity and the market reaction 
We use an alternative purchase ratio to measure the intensity of insider trading based on 
the value of shares purchased and traded by insiders (PR_V) as in (Rozeff and Rahman 
(1988). The results, which are reported in Table 9, are consistent with our earlier result 
using the purchase ratio based on the number of shares purchased and traded. We also 
use the 4-day and 5-day cumulative abnormal returns (i.e. CAR(-1,2) and CAR(-1,3)) 
around directors’ transactions as alternatives measures of the market reaction to insider 
trades. The results, which are reported in Table 10, are consistent with our earlier result 
using CAR(-1,1)21. It should be noted that while both total and unrelated industrial 
diversification are significantly related to CAR(-1,2), only the latter is significantly 
related to CAR(-1,3). This suggests that the market reaction is more significant nearer to 
the date of transactions.   
 
 
5 – Summary and conclusion  
This paper provides evidence that distinguishes the agency effect of corporate 
diversification (i.e. managers diversify to benefit themselves) from the information 
effect of corporate diversification (i.e. diversification exacerbates information 
asymmetries making it difficult for investors to assess true value of their firms). Our 
findings suggest that the intensity of insider purchases is positively related to the extent 
of corporate diversification and to the level of diversification discount. This suggests 
that insiders consider diversification to be value increasing as they put their own wealth 
at stake by investing in their firms. It could be argued that they diversify to increase 
                                                 
21
 We also use CAR(0,1) and CAR(0,3) as the dependent variables. The key results remain the same and 
thus are not tabulated.  
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firm value rather than to extract private benefits, and that Hence, they seektry to signal 
their private information when they perceive that investors undervalue the 
diversification strategies in place. We also find that that the information asymmetries 
measured by the market reaction to insider trading is positively related to the extent of 
corporate diversification. This suggests that outsider investors consider insider trading 
to be more informative for diversified firms. In practical terms, our results could mean 
that whilst diversification may well be for sound commercial reasons, rather than a 
product of the failure of shareholders to reign in their agents, diversification brings with 
it complexity and opacity, with outsiders finding it more difficult to accurately cost 
organisational capabilities. Given that there is considerable scepticism as to the benefits 
of diversification, this, in turn, may intensify pressures on managers to signal their 
confidence in their choices through share purchases.  In practical, policy terms, this 
paper indicates the need for more nuanced understandings as to why firms diversify 
than simply owing to agency failure, and the need to develop more robust mechanisms 
for alleviating the information asymmetries that are the result of diversification. 
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